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INTRODUCTION
The question of how to influence the human rights behavior of
multinational corporations has long been a concern of nongovernmental organizations,' scholars,2 and governments. 3 Their
1. See, e.g., Bennett Freeman et al., A New Approach to Corporate
Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 24
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 424-25 (2001); Morton Winston, NGO
Strategiesfor Promoting CorporateSocial Responsibility, ETHICS & INT'L AFF.,
March 2002, at 71, 73.
2. See, e.g., Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53 (2004); Simon
Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational
Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307 (2004); Surya Deva,
Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and InternationalLaw:
Wherefrom Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003); Emeka Duruigbo, The World
Bank, MultinationalOil Corporations,and the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2005); Maxi Lyons, Case Study, A Case Study in
Multinational Corporate Accountability: Ecuador's Indigenous Peoples Struggle
for Redress, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 701 (2004); Sean D. Murphy, Taking
Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2005); Sukanya Pillay, And Justice For All? Globalization,
MultinationalCorporations,and the Need for Legally Enforceable Human Rights
Protections, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 489 (2004); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate
Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon-An Examination of Forced Labor
Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91 (2002); Heather Bowman, Comment, Ifl Had a Hammer:
The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises as Another Tool to Protect
Indigenous Rights to Land, 15 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 703 (2006); Tawny Aine
Bridgeford, Comment, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational
Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1009 (2003); Christopher N. Franciose, Note, A CriticalAssessment
of the United States' Implementation of the OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational
Enterprises, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223 (2007); Sarah M. Hall, Note,
Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal Liabilities for Violations of
InternationalLaw, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401 (2002); Matthew Nick, Note,
Rethinking Multinational Corporate Governance in Extractive Industries: The
Caspian Development Project and the Promise of Cooperative Governance, 38
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 577 (2005); Allison M. Snyder, Survey, Holding
Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is Non-Financial Disclosure the
Answer?, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 565 (2007); Elisa Westfield, Note,
Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility:
Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality,and Harmonization, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 5 (2003); Larry Catd Backer, Multinational
Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations' Norms on the
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efforts at mobilization, analysis, and regulation have achieved mixed
results.4 More recently, pension funds and other institutional
investors have assumed an important role in channeling such
influence into a form that may exert greater leverage on the decisionmaking process of a multinational corporation: through its
shareholders.' Some companies, notably those with operations in
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate
Social Responsibilities in InternationalLaw, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287
(2006); Julie Campagna, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global
Rule Makers, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1205 (2004); David Weissbrodt & Muria
Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporationsand Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003);
Ann Marie McLoughlin, Comment, International Trend of Multinational
Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses and the Role of the United
States, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 153 (2007); Tracy M. Schmidt, Comment,
Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environmental and
Human Rights Violations: Will the United Nations' "Norms" Provide the Required
Means?, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 217 (2005).
4. Cf Peter Muchlinksi, The Development of Human Rights Responsibilities

for Multinational Enterprises, in

BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND

SOLUTIONS 33, 35, 36 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003) (discussing arguments against the
extension of human rights obligations to multinational corporations). See generally
Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights
Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227
(Philip Alston ed., 2005).
5. This is, to be sure, a slowly emerging trend, and it is particularly true of the
United States. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging
Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 546 (2005) (quoting statistics from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center showing that a majority of the largest mutual funds
in the United States vote against all social and environmental shareholder
proposals; 15 percent vote against nearly all such proposals; and 30 percent cast
abstentions). Pressure to consider such issues has increased, however, since the
introduction of proxy voting rules requiring disclosure on how mutual funds vote
on shareholder resolutions. Id. at 526-27. The United Kingdom, by contrast, has
seen broader support for corporate social responsibility initiatives, with
mainstream institutional investor trade associations, including the Association of
British Insurers and the Institutional Shareholders Committee, issuing statements
about the corporate social responsibility disclosure they expect from portfolio
companies. Id. at 541-43. See generally Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle?
Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the U.K., 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 976 (2002) (discussing corporate social responsibility in the United
Kingdom); Sorcha MacLeod, Corporate Social Responsibility Within the
European Union Framework, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 541 (2005) (describing the
effectiveness of a regional approach to corporate social responsibility); Pall A.
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Myanmar (Burma) and Sudan, have been punished for their ties to
governments engaged in human rights abuses;6 a far larger number
have signed onto voluntary principles and codes of conduct
embracing best practice in the field of human rights.7 These various
efforts to shape behavior through inducements and public pressure
are an admission that traditional regulation through coercion for
violations of specific rights is not working. Praise for "corporate
social responsibility" generally assumes that traditional regulation
cannot work' and critics often assert that the illusion of
Davidsson, Note, Legal Enforcement of CorporateSocial Responsibility within the
EU, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 529 (2002) (detailing progress of corporate social
responsibility within the European Union).
6. See, e.g., Bailing Out of Burma, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 2, 1995, at 18
(describing early efforts to force companies to cease operations in Myanmar);
Evelyn Iritani, Effort to Divestfrom Sudan Picks Up Steam: Religious Groups and
Mainstream Investment Firms Join the Economic Push to End the Violence, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, at CI (noting Talisman's withdrawal from Sudan following
a disinvestment campaign in 2002-03); Laura Smitherman, Divestment Effort
Aimed at Ending Killing in Sudan; 'Blood Money' Targeted as Activists Seek to
Pressure Khartoum Government, BALT. SUN, May 21, 2005, at IA (reporting
efforts to use state legislation to force public pension funds to disinvest from
Sudan over Darfur atrocities).
7. See, e.g., Mark Turner, Blueprint for 21st Century UN Global Compact,
FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2006, at 4 (introducing Principles for Responsible Investment,
promoted under the auspices of the U.N. Global Compact).
8. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the
Corporate Form: A HistoricalPerspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 768 (2005) (arguing that corporations are in a better financial
and technological position to promote human development than either
governments or nonprofit organizations); Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 310 (2004)
(illustrating that corporations have historically been immune from responsibility
for human rights violations, as only States have had the legal personality necessary
to claim rights or bear duties under international agreements); Claire Moore
Dickerson, Ozymandias as Community Project: Managerial/CorporateSocial
Responsibility and the Failureof Transparency, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1036-37
(2003) (focusing on Enron's irresponsible investment policies in the midst of
modem corporate transparency); Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric
or Reality? Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM.
Bus. L.J. 207, 207-08 (2007) (reflecting upon ancient concerns for social
responsibility in one's business ventures); Christiana Ochoa, Towards a
Cosmopolitan Vision ofInternationalLaw: Identifying and Defining CIL Post Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CN. L. REv. 105, 106 (2005) (indicating multinational
corporations are not inherently socially responsible entities); David Weissbrodt,
Business and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 55, 55 (2005) (stating that,
historically, standards for international corporate action have been relatively
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accountability undermines the prospects of establishing an effective
mechanism with teeth and is worse than nothing at all. 9
Leaving aside that larger question of whether formal regulationsuch as through treaty or legislation-is desirable or possible, should
the investors' ad hoc efforts to shape the human rights behavior of
the companies in which they own shares themselves be regulated?
That is, by what standard, if any, should the activist shareholder be
judged? This Article will consider this question by examining one of
the most interesting recent experiments in activist shareholding: the
Council on Ethics of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global.10

unsuccessful); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging
Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005)
(asserting that extra-legal enforcement is preferable to, and more successful than,
legal enforcement).
9. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational
Corporationsand Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 47 (2002) ("Both
domestic governments and international organizations have danced around [the
topic of enforceability of human rights norms], urging voluntary codes of conduct
rather than seeking to impose binding rules of law. I argue that such
circumspection is unfounded. Corporations are already bound by many core human
rights norms. So-called voluntary codes that ask business entities to refrain from
committing genocide or to avoid profiting from slave labor are weak concessions
to the enormous economic and political power of multinational corporations.");
Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding
Norms of CorporateSocial Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 183 (2007)
(criticizing the assumption that economic incentives are the basis for companies to
comply with norms of corporate social responsibility); cf Thomas Nagel, The
Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 131-32 (2005)
(contemplating that NGOs can play the part of an institution enforcing fulfillment
of an individual duty to rescue others). Compare Rachel Kyte, Balancing Rights
with Responsibilities: Looking for the Global Drivers of Materiality in Corporate
Social Responsibility & the Voluntary Initiatives that Develop and Support Them,
23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 559 (2008) (relating growth in the developing world to
alternative means for evincing better corporate behavior), with Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-border
Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World: Balancing Rights with Responsibilities,
23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 451 (2008) (putting into perspective the developmental

obstacles faced by non-western nations).
10. See generally NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, 2006 ANNUAL

REPORT §§ 1, 4.2 (2006), http://www.nbim.no/Upload/NBIM/Reports/2006%20
eng.pdf [hereinafter NORGES BANK 2006 ANNUAL REPORT] (analyzing the market

developments, fund reporting, corporate governance, and ethics of the Pension
Fund).
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Part I briefly introduces the Pension Fund and the Council on
Ethics, surveying the recommendations the Council has made since
its creation in November 2004. Part II then situates the Council's
work in the context of other legal and voluntary frameworks. Part III
considers an issue that has posed a key challenge to the Council's
work: the meaning of "complicity." Part IV then returns to the
question of whether the Council's work is best seen as legal or purely
"ethical."

I. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT PENSION
FUND AND THE COUNCIL ON ETHICS
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund - Global (Statens
pensjonsfond - Utland) ("Fund") is a sovereign wealth fund that

invests surplus wealth produced by Norway's petroleum sector,
principally revenue from taxes and licensing agreements. Known
until January 2006 as the Petroleum Fund of Norway, it is the second
largest pension fund in the world with assets in excess of $300
billion.II
The Fund was created in 1990 by an act of the Norwegian
Parliament (Stortinget).2 Because the Fund was intended to receive
money when there was a budget surplus, the government of Norway
3
made the first transfer only in 1996 for fiscal year 1995.1
Subsequent years were more bountiful, however, and the Fund has
now grown well beyond Norway's annual gross domestic product
("GDP"), which reached $264.4 billion in 2006.14 The Fund is
projected to reach a level of around 250 percent of GDP by 2030.

11. The largest is Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund. See Pension
Funds Online, Top 100 Global Funds (2007), http://www.pensionfundsonline
.co.uk/pdfs/Top- 100-Global-Pension-Funds.pdf.
12. See NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT § 1
(1998),
http://www.nbim.no/Pages/Report
47773.aspx
(describing
the
creation, regulation, and management of the Fund).
13. See TORE ERIKSEN, SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM
SECTOR AND THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND - GLOBAL 7 (2006), http://www.

regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/TheNorwegianPetroleum_
Sectorjte.pdf (outlining the history, mechanism, organization and fiscal policy
behind the Fund).
14. See CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2007,
at 432 (2007) (estimating that the Fund is valued at more than $250 billion).
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Thereafter, as oil revenues diminish, it is expected gradually to
decline. "5

The purpose of the Fund was, first, to avoid the wide fluctuations
of economic activity caused by the petroleum sector. By limiting the
impact of variable oil revenues on government spending and
investing a substantial portion of those revenues abroad, the Fund
reduces these fluctuations and stabilizes the exchange rate.' 6 Second,
the Fund provides a savings vehicle for future generations of
Norwegians-an aim reflected in its re-branding in 2006 as a
"Government Pension" Fund.I7
A. THE TURN TO ETHICS

In addition to these domestic considerations of economic stability
and intergenerational equity, the government of Norway later
adopted two mechanisms addressing the impact of its international
investments. In 2001, it established an "Environmental Fund" within
the larger Fund.' 8 This new instrument invested exclusively in
developed markets and was restricted to acquiring equity in
companies thought to have a limited negative influence on the
environment. Investment targets for the Environmental Fund also
had to meet specific environmental reporting and certification
requirements based on analysis from the British consulting firm
Ethical Investment Research Service.' 9
15. ERIKSEN, supra note 13, at 7 (projecting that by the end of 2010, the Fund
will grow to 180% of mainland GDP). Crude oil production is expected to peak in
2011, while natural gas production will peak around 2013. See id. at 4.
16. Id. at 6 (requiring a phasing in of petroleum revenues to facilitate balanced
development of the economy).
17. Id. at 6-7 (reasoning that the renaming of the Fund would also strengthen
the public's sense of ownership).
18. See Norway Ministry of Finance, Ethical Guidelines for the Government

Pension Fund, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/andre/EthicalGuidelines-for-the-Government-Pension-Fund---Global-/History.html?id=434896
(last visited Mar. 7, 2008) (noting that the Environmental Fund was reintegrated
into the larger Fund in 2004).
19. See generally COUNCIL ON

ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND

-

4-5, 8-9 (2006), http://www.etikkradet.no (follow
"English" hyperlink on the top right; then follow "Annual Reports" hyperlink on
the left; then follow "Annual Report 2006" hyperlink) [hereinafter PENSION FUND,
2006 ANNUAL REPORT] (identifying sources of information from whom the
Council gathers information for recommendations); NORGES BANK INVESTMENT
GLOBAL, ANNUAL REPORT
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In the same year, the Ministry of Finance appointed an Advisory
Commission on International Law for the Fund. The Commission
responded to requests from the Ministry as to whether specific
investments were in conflict with Norway's commitments under
international law. In March 2002, the Commission responded to such

a request concerning

Singapore Technologies Engineering.

It

concluded that, as there was "a large degree of probability" that the

company through a subsidiary produced anti-personnel mines, even
modest investments in the company could constitute a violation of
Norway's obligations under the Ottawa Convention on AntiPersonnel Mines. 0 Such an investment could imply a violation of the

Ottawa Convention prohibition on "assist[ing]" the production of
anti-personnel mines. 21 A month later the government formally
excluded Singapore Technologies Engineering from the Fund's

investment universe.22
MANAGEMENT, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT § 1 (2001), http://www.nbim.no/Pages
/Report
47735.aspx (clarifying the weighing of the Petroleum Fund's equity
portfolio in comparison with the Environmental Fund's portfolio); Letter from
Svein Gjedrem and Harald Bohn, Norges Bank to Norway Ministry of Finance
(Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Article
15831.aspx (proposing recommendations for how the Petroleum Fund's
portfolio should be determined).
20. See The Petroleum Fund Advisory Comm'n on International Law,
Memorandum to the Ministry of Finance: Question of Whether Investments in
Singapore Technologies Engineering Can Imply a Violation of Norway's
International
Obligations
(Mar. 22,
2002),
http://www.regjeringen.no
/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/andre/Ethical-Guidelines-for-the-Govermment-PensionFund---Global-/Advisory-Commission-Documents/AdvisoryCommission.html?id=413581 [hereinafter Advisory Commission Memorandum]
(unofficial English translation) (finding a violation even though an investment of a
modest degree would make little difference to Singapore Technologies
Engineering); Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production &
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction art. 1 (1) (b), Sept. 18,
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 241, 36 I.L.M 1507 (1997) [hereinafter Mine Ban Treaty]
(prohibiting States Parties from developing, producing, otherwise acquiring,
stockpiling, retaining or transferring anti-personnel mines).
21. See Advisory Commission Memorandum, supra note 20 (citing the Mine
Ban Treaty, which provides that States Parties should never "assist, encourage or
induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention").
22. See id.; see also Norway Ministry of Finance, Companies Excluded from
the Investment Universe, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics
/andre/Ethical-Guidelines-for-the-Govermment-Pension-Fund---Global-/Companies
-Excluded-from-the-Investment-U.html?id=447122 (last visited Mar. 7, 2008)
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In Fall 2002, the government appointed a committee to develop
more general ethical guidelines for the Fund's investments. The
committee, which was chaired by Professor Hans Petter Graver,
reported on June 25, 2003. In recognition of the pluralism of
Norwegian society and the fact that beneficiaries of the Fund
included future generations, the foundation of the ethical guidelines
was made broad and relatively vague. The Graver Report sought to
identify an overlapping consensus of ethical values that were
consistent over time,23 relying largely on internationally-accepted
principles rather than seeking to develop a separate basis founded on
Norwegian national culture or policy. 24 The Graver Report
specifically cited principles on protection of the environment, human
rights, labor standards, and corporate governance embodied in the
U.N. Global Compact 25 and adopted by the International Labour
Organization ("ILO"),26 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation

(listing the companies that have been excluded because of Council
recommendations to date).
23. See Norway Ministry of Finance, The Report From the Graver Committee
§ 2.1
(July
11,
2003), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selectedtopics/andre/Ethical-Guidelines-for-the-Government-Pension-Fund---Global-/TheGraver-Committee---documents/Report-on-ethical-guidelines.html?id=420232
[hereinafter Graver Committee Report] (unofficial English translation)
(recognizing that most of the people for whom the Fund is managed, such as future
generations of Norwegians, cannot choose the Fund manager or the Fund's
investment criteria).
24. Id. § 4.2 (supporting those international principles on which there is broad
consensus in Norway).
25. See U.N. Global Compact, About the Global Compact: The Ten Principles
of the
Global
Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC
/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Ten
Principles] (deriving these principles from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption). See
generally Graver Committee Report, supra note 23; Surya Deva, Global Compact:
A Critique of the U.N. 's "Public-Private"Partnershipfor Promoting Corporate
Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 111 (2006) (hailing the
Compact as "the world's largest and most widely embraced corporate citizenship
initiative"); William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global

Compact, and Global Governance, 34

CORNELL

INT'L

L.J. 501 (2001)

(summarizing prior research on transnational corporations and the potential for the
Global Compact to have an effect on company behavior).
26. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY
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and Development ("OECD")'27 and the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.28
33-40 (4th ed. 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english
/employment/multi/download/declaration2006.pdf
(listing work and life
conditions, and rules on equality of opportunity, employment security, and
industrial relations). See generally Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrre,
Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995) (comparing the ILO Tripartite Declaration
to the OECD Code in that neither have sanctions to back up their rules); Bob
Hepple, A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 347 (1999) (documenting a period
after the Second World War in which the ILO dominated international labor law
with its focus on collective labor law); Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage:
CombiningPublic and Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and
Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 203, 223 (2007) (noting that a country's
compliance with ILO standards does not ipso facto result in the enforcement of
those standards ).
27. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[OECD], THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: REVISION
2000,
at
21-25
(2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/56/36/1922428.pdf (including standards on disclosure, consumer interests, science
and technology, competition, and taxation). See generally Elisa Morgera, An
Environmental Outlook on the OECD Guidelines for MultinationalEnterprises:
ComparativeAdvantage, Legitimacy, and Outstanding Questions in the Lead Up to
the 2006 Review, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 751 (2006) (analyzing the
practical impact of the OECD guidelines on environmental protection); James
Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization, and Institutions: The Role and Influence of
the Organizationfor Economic Cooperationand Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 769 (2000) (highlighting the role of the OECD in more that just economic areas
through researching, lawmaking, and helping to set an international policy
agenda); Franciose, supra note 2 (discussing the institutional framework behind
the OECD Guidelines, including national contact points and the Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises).
28. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Prot. of Human, Comm'n on Human Rts., Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2

(Aug. 26, 2003) (laying out standards for equal

opportunity, personal security, worker rights, national sovereignty, and consumer
protection); see also David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International
Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 959-60, 997-98 (2004) (illustrating the role of the
U.N. human rights committees in monitoring transnational corporation compliance
with human rights standards); Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global
Actors Accountable Under InternationalLaw, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691,
751-52 (2006) (accounting for many soft law mechanisms in holding transnational
companies responsible including OECD Guidelines, the U.N. Global Compact, and
the ILO Tripartite Declaration); Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and
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Such a pragmatic formulation of substantive obligations was also
an attempt to avoid problems of theory. The Graver Report explicitly
sought to embrace both teleological and deontological schools of
ethics.29 Teleological ethics, such as utilitarianism,30 emphasize the
importance of consequences; deontological ethics, such as Kant's
categorical imperative,3 hold that one should do the right thing not
in order to achieve a goal, but simply because it is right. 32 The two
schools are also known as consequentialism and nonconsequentialism, respectively.3 3 Though the division is not quite so
neat and the position of individual theorists is often far more subtle,
these two broad approaches to ethics are reflected in the two
investment management instruments-shareholder activism and

"Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457, 464
(2004) (questioning the impact on the oil and gas industry of incorporating the
U.N. Norms into a treaty). See ,enerally Carlos M. Vdzquez, Direct vs. Indirect
Obligations of Corporations Under InternationalLaw, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 927 (2005) (explaining why the Commission on Human Rights declined adopt
the U.N. Norms); Troy Rule, Recent Development, Using "Norms" to Change
InternationalLaw: UN Human Rights Laws Sneaking in Through the Back Door?,
5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 325, 328 (2004) (attempting to clarify different views on the
effects of the Norms on the existing body of international human rights law).
29. See Graver Committee Report, supra note 23, § 2.2 (opting out of a third
ethical perspective emphasizing retribution, as that motive is beyond the
obligations of the Fund).
30. See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, in THE UTILITARIANS 5, 17 (1961) (laying the foundation for the
principles of utilitarianism);
DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF
UTILITARIANISM 3 (1965) (separating utilitarianism into two basic types which are
separated by the generality of judgment and the way value criteria are applied to
acts); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (George Sher ed., 2d ed. 2001)
(holding that actions are right to the extent that they promote happiness);
FREDERICK ROSEN, CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM FROM HUME TO MILL 9-11 (2003)
(elucidating the relevance of utilitarianism for political and legal theorists).
31. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 2425 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (defining a categorical
imperative as one that represented an action as objectively necessary in itself,
without reference to another end).
32. See generally DEONTOLOGY (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003) (differentiating
the basic theories of deontology and consequentialism by defining the duty of one
person to another based on agent-relative rather than agent-neutral values).
33. See generally CONSEQUENTIALISM (Stephen L. Darwall ed., 2003); MORAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM MONTAIGNE TO KANT 462 (Jerome Schneewind ed., 1990)

(comparing Bentham's rules of gauging utility of an action with the opposite
theory developed by Kant).
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investment screening-ultimately adopted to implement the general
standards to which the Norwegian Fund would be held.
The first instrument, reflecting the teleological conception of
ethics, was the exercise of active ownership rights to promote longterm financial returns, which is explicitly understood to include the
protection of human rights and sustainable development. When the
Ministry of Finance adopted ethical guidelines that included
environmental considerations, the Environmental Fund as a separate
entity was discontinued.34 Those general guidelines now provide that
the overall investment objective remains safeguarding the Fund's
financial interests, but that the exercise of ownership rights "shall
mainly be based on the U.N.'s Global Compact and the OECD
Guidelines for Corporate Governance and for Multinational
Enterprises."3 Norges Bank, which administers the Fund, is required
to report on how it has acted as owner representative and explain
how it has promoted "special interests relating to the long-term
horizon and diversification of investments in accordance with" the
guidelines on ownership.36
The second instrument is the exclusion from the Fund's
investment universe, either through negative screening or
disinvestment,37 of companies that pose an "unacceptable risk" of
shareholder complicity in gross or systematic breaches of ethical
norms within the areas of human rights and the environment. Though
exclusion may in some circumstances influence the behavior of
companies, the Graver Report focused on the importance of utilizing
exclusion as a means of avoiding the Fund's own complicity in
ethically suspect activity, rather than as a means of influencing the
34.

See NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT,

2004

ANNUAL REPORT § 1

(2004), http://www.nbim.no/Pages/Report
47696.aspx#l (recounting that the
Environmental Fund investments were transferred to the Petroleum Fund portfolio
after the Ministry of Finance approved certain ethical guidelines for the Petroleum
Fund).
35. Norway Ministry of Finance, Ethical Guidelines: Government Pension
Fund-Global § 3.1 (Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/Styrer-radutvalg/ethicscouncil/Ethical-Guidelines.html
[hereinafter Ethical Guidelines]
(unofficial English translation).
36. Id. § 3.2.
37. Divestment or divestiture, sometimes used in this context, is a more general
term meaning the reduction of some kind of asset. Disinvestment is used here to
indicate the selling of assets for ethical purposes.
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activity itself.38 This was seen as an extension of the work of the
Advisory Commission on International Law,3 9 which was replaced in
December 2004 by a five-member Council on Ethics. Reflecting the
deontological conception of ethics, the focus of the Council's work is
on avoiding the risk of doing the wrong thing rather than ensuring a
desirable course of action is followed. Moreover, the Council's
examination is focused-at least technically--on the potential for
Norwegian complicity rather than the actual conduct of the company
in question. As the Graver Report observed, "the Council does not
have to prove that a company is guilty of unethical practices. ' 40 As
we shall see, for some companies this is a distinction without a
difference.
Formally, the Council submits recommendations to the Ministry of
Finance which makes final decisions on negative screening and
exclusion of companies from the investment universe. 41 These
recommendations and decisions are to be made public, though there
is provision for a delay in publication in order to "ensure a
financially sound implementation of the exclusion of the company
concerned. '42 This recognizes the likelihood that a recommendation
or decision to disinvest may have a negative impact on the share
price of the company in question; keeping that information closely
held enables the Fund to sell at what would presumably be a higher
share price.

38. See Graver Committee Report, supra note 23, § 5.1 ("The Committee does
not recommend the use of exclusion as a means of exerting influence. The
Committee believes that the exercise of ownership rights might be more effective
in influencing a company's conduct. Disposing of holdings in a company in order
to influence its conduct presupposes that the publicity around the Fund's
withdrawal would result in the company changing its practices. It is not realistic to
believe that by excluding a company the Fund could contribute to reducing the
company's access to capital or causing demand for the company's stock to decline
in such a way that the company would be compelled to change its conduct.
Negative publicity, on the other hand, might influence the company.").
39. The Council took on the Advisory Commission's task of responding to
requests concerning Norway's compliance with international law. See Ethical
Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.3.
40. Graver Committee Report, supra note 23, § 5.4. See generally Ramasastry,
supra note 2 (exploring the "historical origins" of multinational corporations'
complicity in violations of international law).
41. Ethical Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.1.
42. See Id.
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The five members of the Council include three academics at the
University of Oslo,43 a professional scientist, 44 and a professional
economist.4 5 The Council is given broad power to make
recommendations on its own initiative.46 The first basis for exclusion
of a company is for "production of weapons that through their
normal use may violate fundamental humanitarian principles. '47 In
addition, the Council may issue a recommendation
because of acts or omissions that constitute an unacceptable risk of the
Fund contributing to:
" Serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture,
deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour
and other forms of child exploitation
" Serious violations of individuals' rights in situations of war or conflict
" Severe environmental damage
" Gross corruption
48
" Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.

This clearly allows wide discretion on the part of the Council,
which is not constituted as a court, but is nevertheless required to
"gather all necessary information at its own discretion and ...ensure
that the matter is documented as fully as possible. '49 When the
Council is considering an exclusion recommendation, "the company
in question shall receive the draft recommendation and the reasons
for it, for comment."50 As might be expected, questions of burden of
proof and natural justice swiftly arose.51
Finally, the Council is tasked with regularly reviewing whether the
grounds for exclusion of a particular company continue to apply. If
the Council receives new information that neutralizes the concerns
relied upon in an original exclusion recommendation, it may

43. See PENSION FUND, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 7 (listing Gro
Nystuen, Chair of the Committee, along with Andreas Follesdal and Ola Mestad).
44. See id. (listing Anne Lill Gade).
45. See id. (listing Bjorn Ostbo, an economist serving as Chief Executive
Officer at Vital Eiendom AS).
46. See Ethical Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 4.5.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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recommend to the Ministry of Finance the revocation of a decision to
exclude.52
B. THE COUNCIL'S RECOMMENDATIONS

In its first two years leading up to January 2007, the Council
published ten recommendations, all of which were adopted by the
Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Six concerned recommendations to
exclude one or more companies from the investment universe: (i)
Kerr-McGee for activities off the coast of the non-self-governing
territory Western Sahara; 3 (ii) seven companies producing cluster
weapons components;5 4 (iii) seven companies producing nuclear

weapons components;55 (iv) Wal-Mart Stores Inc. for unacceptable
working conditions in some of the company's own stores and among

52. Ethical Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.6.
53. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Exclusion From the Government Petroleum
Fund's Investment Universe of The Company Kerr-McGee Corporation (Apr. 11,
2005),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1662901/KMG%20eng%2011%20april
English
Corporation] (unofficial
%202005.pdf [hereinafter Kerr-McGee
translation) (concluding that Kerr-McGee's involvement in Western Sahara falls
under the "other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms"
category because the company's activities aid the Moroccan government's
unethical exploration of the area and bolster its claim for sovereignty).
54. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Exclusion of Cluster Weapons From the
16, 2005), http://www.regjeringen
Government Petroleum Fund (June
.no/pages/1661742/Tilrhdning%20klasev~pen%20eng%2015 %20juni%202005.pdf
(unofficial English translation) (describing a cluster weapon as a canister
containing explosive devices or bomblets). The companies excluded were Alliant
Techsystems Inc., European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company ("EADS"),
General Dynamics Corp., L3 Communications Holdings Inc., Lockheed Martin
Corporation, Raytheon Company, and Thales SA.
55. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Exclusion of Companies That Are Involved
in Production of Nuclear Weapons (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no
/pages/ 1661428/Tilrhdning%20kjernevipen%20engelsk%201 9%20sept%202005.p
df (unofficial English translation) (citing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons as the body of international law that bans most nations from
possessing these types of weapons and adding that "many would ... argue that the
use of nuclear weapons violates fundamental humanitarian principles"). The
companies excluded were BAE Systems Plc., Finmeccanica SpA, Boeing
Company, Honeywell International Inc., Northrop Grumman, United Technologies
Corp. and Safran SA. See id.
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suppliers; 6 (v) Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. for
environmental damage;5 7 and (vi) Poongsan Corporation, also for
production of cluster weapons components.58 Two recommendations
considered allegations of improper activity but did not call for
exclusion of the relevant companies: the first concerned whether two
weapons systems in development constituted violations of the
Ottawa Convention;5 9 the second concerned disinvestment from
Total S.A. because of its operations in Myanmar.6 ° Just over a year
after it excluded Kerr-McGee, the Council revoked its decision on
56. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Exclusion of Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (Nov.
15, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1661427/Tilrhdning%20WM%20eng
%20format.pdf [hereinafter Wal-Mart] (unofficial English translation) (noting that
Wal-Mart has been known to engage in gender discrimination, prevent its
employees from joining trade unions, and, at least in the United States, hire illegal
immigrants); see also infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
57. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Exclusion of Freeport McMoRan Copper
& Gold Inc. (Feb. 15, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1956975/F
%20Recommendation%2OFinal.pdf [hereinafter Freeport McMoRan] (unofficial
English translation) (concluding that the company's mining operations violate not
only international law but may also potentially violate Indonesia's environmental
regulations).
58. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Exclusion of Poongsan Corp. (Sept. 6,
2006),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/I 784693/Poongsan,%20Unofficial%20
English%20translation.pdf (unofficial English translation) (noting that the
company failed to respond to Norges Bank's request for information regarding its
production of cluster munitions).
59. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics Concerning Whether the Weapons Systems
Spider and Intelligent Munition System (IMS) Might Be Contrary to International
Law (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1662930/Tilrddning%20
Spider%201MS%20%2OEnglish%2020.pdf [hereinafter Weapons Systems Spider]
(unofficial English translation) (explaining that the weapon systems do not
presently violate international law because they are "operator-activated systems"
and, as such, they don't qualify as antipersonnel land mines prohibited under
Article 2 of the Ottawa Convention).
60. See Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of Finance, The
Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Total S.A. (Nov. 14, 2005),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1662906/oversettelse%20T%204%20jan%2006.p
df [hereinafter Total S.A.] (unofficial English translation) (clarifying the notion
that exclusion from the Fund is not based on a company's past conduct, but on its
present and future behavior, and reasoning that, despite its past actions, Total S.A.
has now acquired a "visible public profile focusing on human rights and social
responsibility").
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the basis that the company had ceased operations off the coast of
Western Sahara.6 The Council also published a decision finding that
its exclusion of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company ("EADS") for production of cluster munitions was no
longer supportable because EADS had sold its investment in a
munitions producing joint venture. However, the Council in the same
recommendation kept the exclusion in place in light of EADS's
involvement in the manufacture of nuclear weapons components.6 2
By the start of 2007, nineteen companies had been excluded, leaving
about 4,000 in the Fund's portfolio.6 3
In addition to the predictable displeasure on the part of companies
publicly excluded from investment by the Fund, there has been some
measure of criticism within Norway of the Council's activity. In an
article published in the newspaper Dagens Nceringsliv, the Chair of
the Council, Gro Nystuen, responded to some of these criticisms,
including claims that the Council did not allow companies the
opportunity to rebut accusations of improper activity and that
companies that did answer accusations were excluded nonetheless.
Nystuen clarified that allegations are substantiated with "concrete
references to sources" and that companies being assessed for
exclusion are sent a letter and invited to "comment on the
allegations. '" 64 Nystuen explained:
I would assume that this process represents a more or less universal
method for processing allegations and accusations. Whether one wants to

complain about an administrative decision, respond to a complaint from
61. See Recommendation

from the Norway

Ministry of Finance, The

Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on Suspension of Exclusion of Kerr-McGee
Corp. (May 24, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957945/KMG%2OMay
%2024%202006,%20Unofficial%20English%20translation.pdf (unofficial English
translation) (explaining that the company "had ceased its activities in Boujdour
field and that the licence [sic] to conduct explorations had expired in April 2006").
62. See Supplementary Recommendation from the Norway Ministry of
Finance, The Petroleum Fund's Council of Ethics on EADS Co. (Apr. 18, 2006),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1662936/EADS%2OEngelsk.pdf
(unofficial
English translation) (declaring that EADS is involved in the production of the

ASMP-A nuclear warhead air-to surface missile and the M51 submarine-launched
ballistic missile).
63. See PENSION FUND, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 10.
64. Gro Nystuen, Etikk og kritikk [Ethics and Criticism], DAGENs NAERINGSLIV,
Sept. 11, 2006, at 4 (responding to criticism concerning the exclusion of
companies from the Fund).
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the neighbor, or challenge a criminal indictment, it is a basic requirement
that the claims which are presented are concrete and that they are well
substantiated and documented. It is much
more difficult to respond to, or
65
counter, vague allegations or rumors.

The response was suggestive of the unusual nature of the Council
on Ethics. Technically, it is not a legal tribunal bound by rules of due
process, and technically, it focuses on the risk of complicity on the
part of the Fund rather than proof of allegations against a given
company. 6666 In practice, however, it has justified its decisions on
quasi-legal grounds, establishing precedent and following or
distinguishing prior decisions. It has also adopted a quasi-adversarial
procedure, allowing companies the opportunity to hear allegations
and respond to them, though without the full trappings of an official
legal procedure. This begs the question of whether the Council is
properly seen as an ethical or legal body, a point to which we will
return in Part IV.

II. LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Regulating the activities of corporations that operate across
national borders poses a challenge to the international legal order,
which revolves around the conduct of states. The largest
multinationals dwarf the economies of many countries; frequently
they are also able to mobilize greater political influence. 67 As the
Council noted in its Exclusion of Wal-Mart recommendation, Wal-

65. Id. (translation by author).
66. Cf Total S.A., supra note 60, at 3.1 (explaining that the Council's role is to
assess whether it would be "contribut[ing] to companies' complicity" in violations
of human rights if it were to invest in them).
67. Texaco operated for years in Ecuador "with annual global earnings four
times the size of Ecuador's GNP and [with] the active support of the U.S.
government." See Chris Jochnick, Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors:
New Fieldsfor the Promotion of Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 56, 58, 65 (1999)
(noting that developing countries often face transnational corporations "with
revenues many times larger than their domestic economies").
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Mart's annual turnover is larger than the GDP of 161 of the world's
states.68
Nevertheless, efforts to analyze and delimit the international legal
status of natural persons have had far more success than comparable
efforts with respect to their juridical counterparts. 69 This is due in
part to the longer history of prosecuting individuals. The Nuremberg
Trials are the iconic example of this, but these trials built upon a
tradition of individual responsibility at international law, most
consistently with respect to pirates.70 In addition, however, war
criminals and g~nocidaireshave fewer defenders in the governments
of the wealthy countries that frequently drive transformations in the
law. 7
Evidence of this different treatment is found in the debates over
whether to include corporations within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court. At the negotiations in Rome in 1998,
the delegation of France pushed for inclusion of criminal liability of
"legal persons" or "juridical persons" on the basis that this would
make it easier for victims of crimes to sue for restitution and
compensation.72 Differences in the forms of accountability of
corporate entities across jurisdictions, where such entities exist at all,
meant that consensus was impossible and the language was
ultimately dropped.73 The International Criminal Court was

68. See Wal-Mart, supra note 56, § 4.1.2. (adding that the company's "annual
turnover is equivalent to about 2% of the Domestic Gross Product [sic] of the
USA").
69. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (5th
ed., 1998) (explaining that individuals have faced criminal liability pursuant to
international law since the mid-1800s).
70. See generally id. at 235-37 (providing an overview of the definition of
piracy).
71. Cf Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The International Criminal Court:
Bottlenecks To Individual Criminal Liability in the Rome Statute, 2 ANN. SURV.
INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 196, 202, 217 (2006) (warning that developing countries
often view international criminal tribunals as another instrument of western
domination).
72. See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189, 199
(Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
73. See id. (noting that the French delegation was in fact able to gain the
support of a majority of countries with notable holdouts including the Russian
Federation, Japan, and Nordic states); Albin Eser, Individual Criminal
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ultimately created,74 but there is no comparable regulatory
framework for corporations. Instead, six months after the Rome
Statute was adopted, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a
"Global Compact," challenging business leaders to abide by
principles on human rights, labor, and the environment that are
essentially voluntary.75
In theory, of course, legal controls on the activities of a
multinational corporation do exist. This Part will briefly review the
possibility of holding corporations accountable before considering
the impact of non-legal mechanisms on corporate behavior.
A. REGULATION IN THE LOCAL JURISDICTION

First, it is appropriate to regulate the activities of a corporation in
the jurisdiction in which it actually operates. Wrongs committed by
multinational actors will generally occur within a given jurisdiction.
As such, primary responsibility for pursuing a remedy should lie
with the state in which the wrong occurs.76 This is supported by a
general principle in human rights and other conventions that states
parties undertake "to respect and to ensure" certain rights.77
This will not always be effective, however. A state may be unable
or unwilling to regulate the activities of an entity with far greater
Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 779 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
74. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9
(1998),
available at
http://www.icc-

cpi/int/library/about/officialjoumal/RomeStatute_120704_EN.pdf
(proclaiming
"jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern").
75. See Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality?
CorporateSocial Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 207,
211 (2007) (admitting that although voluntary codes of conduct such as the Global

Compact are without enforcement mechanisms, they have an important educational
value for corporations as well as developing countries). See generally U.N. Global
Compact, Overview, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/index.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2008).
76. See Jochnick, supra note 67, at 65-66 (contending that a government's

responsibility to protect its citizens' human rights requires it to pass and enforce
legislation regulating transnational corporations operating within its borders).
77. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19,
1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Each State Party to the present

Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.").
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economic and political power than the institutions of government. In
some cases, the government itself may be perpetrating abuses in
which a corporation is complicit. In those situations, it may be more
appropriate or more effective to seek redress in other jurisdictions.
The most obvious is to go to the jurisdiction in which the corporation
has its base-and, more importantly, its assets.
B. REGULATION IN THE HOME JURISDICTION OF A MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION

Second, therefore, legal remedies may in some circumstances be
pursued in the home jurisdiction of a multinational corporationparticularly when that jurisdiction is the United States. When it can
be established that a corporation or its officers have violated the laws
of the country in which it is incorporated or in which it maintains its
registered offices-for example by engaging in practices that are
proscribed even if they take place extraterritorially-bringing an
action against the corporation in that home jurisdiction might be an
attractive avenue.78 This section will briefly consider one important
barrier to such proceedings, the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
and the most important means of avoiding it in the most important
jurisdiction: the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act.7 9
Forum non conveniens is a conflict of laws principle that permits a
forum technically entitled to exercise jurisdiction over a matter to
forgo such jurisdiction in favor of another forum that could entertain
the case more conveniently.8" In the Bhopal case,8" for example, a

78. See, e.g., Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and
Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 409

(2002) (arguing that because local courts in a host state are often unable or
unwilling to process a claim or rule against a powerful transnational corporation,

tort action in the corporation's home state may be the most effective way to
address private complaints).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (entrusting district courts with original
jurisdiction over tort cases brought by aliens where the alleged tort violated

universal international law or a U.S. treaty).
80. Forum non conveniens rules are embodied in federal practice, for the most
part, in the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See generally RONALD A.
BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL
PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS (2007).
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pesticide plant in India run by the subsidiary of the U.S. company
Union Carbide malfunctioned. Clouds of toxic gas were released,
killing thousands and crippling many more.82 India filed a civil suit
in the U.S. federal courts against the parent company, alleging that it
functioned in all material respects as the same enterprise as the
Indian subsidiary and that relevant conduct occurred in the United
States. 3 The trial judge accepted the defendant's forum non
conveniens argument.84 Soon after the U.S. proceedings were
dismissed, a $500 million settlement was brokered under the
auspices of the Indian Supreme Court. This was a large amount by
Indian standards, but far less than what a US. civil jury might have
85

awarded.

This approach was followed in subsequent cases in the United
States until the late- 1990s, 8 6 including a large number of cases
81. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F.Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
82. See id. at 844 (asserting that the exact number of immediate fatalities is
unknown). Estimates of the number of individuals killed or injured as a
consequence of the Bhopal disaster range as high as two-hundred thousand people.
See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes For The Transboundary
Movement Of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 32 (1994).
83. But see In re Union Carbide,634 F. Supp. at 855-56 (accepting that Union
Carbide was under the "specific control" of the Indian government and that Union
Carbide's involvement in the Bhopal project was limited to certain design
elements).
84. See id. at 865-67 (concluding that India's interest in the Bhopal litigation
outweighed that of the United States and that an Indian court would be better
suited to apply Indian law).
85. See Craig Scott, MultinationalEnterprisesand Emergent Jurisprudenceon
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 563, 588-89 (Asbjom Eide et al. eds., 2001)
(noting that two precedents were the "silver lining" to the relatively paltry
outcome: submission of a transnational parent company to "jurisdiction in a
country where it had no legal presence" and acceptance of liability by a
transnational parent for harm caused by its subsidiary).
86. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377, 381-84 (5th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the argument that Mexican law provides inadequate remedies for tort
victims and refusing to replace Mexican policy preferences with American ones,
for fear of being imperialistic and patronizing); Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co., 941
F.Supp. 1512, 1529 (D. Minn. 1996) (yielding to defendant's home forum due to
Guatemala's strong interest in redressing injury to its own citizens); Ernst v. Ernst,
722 F.Supp. 61, 64-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (deciding that France was the proper
forum for a contractual dispute because it would best serve the convenience of all
parties and the "ends of justice").
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against the extractive industry.87 Wrongs alleged range from harm to
the environment and harm to human health, to corporate complicity
in physical brutality, including forced labor, torture, and slavery.88
More recently, however, there is evidence that courts are moving
toward reducing the bad faith use of this doctrine. Courts have, for
example, conditioned the grant of forum non conveniens claims on
an agreement by the defendant to submit to a court in the foreign
jurisdiction.89
One way of avoiding these procedural hurdles in the United States
is recourse through the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), which has
become central to the recent history of such proceedings against
multinational corporations.9" ATCA was originally intended to bring
pirates to justice and was enacted in 1789 at the first session of the
U.S. Congress.9 ATCA authorizes civil lawsuits in U.S. district
courts by aliens for torts committed "in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 92 Rediscovered almost two
centuries later in a case brought in the United States by Paraguayan
87. See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F.Supp. 899, 900 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (dismissing the claims of Peruvian citizens against a Peruvian mining
corporation for damages stemming from pollution). More recently, the fashion in
litigation has tended towards apparel and footwear companies, reflecting the
somewhat arbitrary manner of case selection on the basis of popular opinion. E.g.,
Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (seeking
equitable relief including an environmental clean-up of Ecuadorian land devastated
by oil exploration and extraction); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 61 (S.D.
Tex. 1994) (alleging corporate responsibility for air, ground, and water
contamination in Ecuador).
89. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to
dismiss for forum non conveniens unless defendant Texaco agreed to submit to
Ecuadorian jurisdiction); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir.
2002) (observing that the adequate alternative forum requirement is ordinarily met
when the defendant is agreeable to adjudication in the other jurisdiction). See also
Chesterman, supra note 2, at 317-18 (noting that the Aguinda decision was
intended to keep the forum non conveniens doctrine from being used in bad faith).
90. See Alex Markels, Showdown for a Tool In Rights Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2003, at C1I (stating that the "once-obscure" law has been used to bring
cases based on human rights abuses such as torture and genocide).
91. See Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, Remarks at
the University of Oregon School of Law: Human Rights as a Response to
Terrorism (Feb. 11, 2004), in 6 OR. REV. INT'L L., Spring 2004, at 37, 50 (asserting
that the Alien Tort Claims Act gave U.S. courts jurisdiction over captured pirates).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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citizens against a former Inspector General of Police in Paraguay, the
procedure is unique to the United States.93
ATCA actions were largely thought of as symbolic as no judgment
under ATCA has yet been enforced; however, in 2005, Unocal
94
settled an action alleging that it used forced labor in Myanmar.
Ironically, this sole example of satisfaction of an ATCA judgment
corresponds to the factual situation in which the Council on Ethics
issued its only recommendation for non-exclusion of a specific
95
company in the case of Total's operations in Myanmar.
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law may, in some circumstances, provide a third
arena in which legal remedies may be pursued, particularly through
the emerging discourse of international criminal law. Some
international crimes may be committed by individuals. Examples
include piracy, including aircraft hijacking; enslavement, including
forced labor; genocide; war crimes; and crimes against humanity.9 6
Other crimes may be committed only by states.97 It has been accepted
at least since the war crimes trials after the Second World War that
93. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 876, 887, 889 (2d Cir. 1980)
(acknowledging that U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction over such claims and
reversing the lower court, which had dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction). Cf Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporationsin the U.S.
for Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 143
(1999) (concluding that U.S. courts have a unique mandate to take on violations of
international law).
94. Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses
at Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at Cl ("Monetary terms of the
settlement weren't made public. However, a statement released by both sides said
the agreement would provide compensation for the villagers and provide money
'to develop programs to improve living conditions, healthcare and education and
protect the rights of people from the pipeline region."').
95. Total S.A., supra note 60, 4.2.6 (differentiating Total's mere knowledge
of human rights abuses from Unocal's knowledge that abuses were perpetrated in
the company's own interest). Unocal had been found complicit in human rights
abuses but the Council on Ethics concluded that Total could not be labeled as such.
Id.
96. See BROWNLIE, supra note 69, at 565-68 (accepting that since the late 19th
century, individual actions may be punished by international tribunals and national
or military courts).
97. See generally id. at 435-78 (discussing the responsibilities and obligations
of states).
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individuals may be held accountable for acts undertaken through
corporations.98 A more controversial possibility is that corporations
themselves may be held liable.
In general, international criminal prosecution has tended to pursue
the individual. As the Nuremberg Tribunal observed, "Crimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced." 99 Although the
court was referring to the danger of allowing individuals to hide
behind the veil of the state, the underlying principle could be seen as
applicable to the corporate veil as well.' 0 Aside from such veilpiercing arguments, establishing the liability of the corporation itself
could be appropriate in and of itself, especially if the organizational
structure of the corporation made it difficult to establish the criminal
responsibility of particular individuals that comprise the corporation.
In practice, however, this area of international law remains of
academic rather than practical interest.' 0'

98. See, e.g., United Kingdom v. Tesch et al. ("The Zyklon B Case") 1 I.L.R.
93, 93 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg 1946) (condemning
to death two individuals, Bruno Tesch and Karl Weinbacher, for supplying poison
gas to concentration camps with the knowledge that it was used to kill prisoners).
99. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 466 (William S. Hein, 1995) (1947).
100. See Terry Collingsworth, SeparatingFactfrom Fiction in the Debate over
Application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights by Corporations, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 563, 569 (2003) (maintaining that
aiding and abetting is an established criminal liability standard dating back at least
to the Nuremburg Tribunal, where German industrialists were punished for aiding
and abetting the Nazi regime).
101. Conceptual problems once seen as a bar to corporate criminal liability in
domestic law now largely have been overcome. Traditional reservations arose from
the nature of a corporate entity being a creature of law with no physical existence
and the difficulty of establishing the requisite mens rea to attribute criminal
liability. See, e.g., Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., [1915] A.C.
705, 713 (H.L.). One leg of this bar to corporate responsibility specifically
concerned the penalty that could be imposed following conviction. Clearly, a crime
punishable only by imprisonment (or death) hardly could be attributed to a
corporation without a substantial change to our conception of sentencing. Rex v.
I.C.R. Haulage, Ltd., [1944] K.B. 551, 554 (Crim. App.). The absence of an
alternative penalty to imprisonment is arguably still a bar to convicting a
corporation of murder in some jurisdictions. Chris Corns, The Liability of
Corporationsfor Homicide in Victoria, 15 CRIM. L.J. 351, 354 (1991). A second
consideration relates to certain crimes which are considered to be of such a nature
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D. VOLUNTARY CODES

A few days after the Rome Statute was adopted in July 1998, the
Financial Times published an article warning that the accomplice
liability provisions in the treaty "could create international criminal
liability for employees, officers and directors of corporations."'0 0
This was technically true, but the failure to include the liability of
juridical persons within the Court's jurisdiction and the likely
difficulties of establishing individual guilt on the part of corporate
officers meant that the breadth of the accomplice liability provisions
was somewhat exaggerated.
Six months later, at the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos,
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact.0 3
"The Compact is not a regulatory instrument-it does not 'police,'

that only a human could commit them (for example, sexual offenses, bigamy, and,
arguably, perjury). Dean v. John Menzies (Holdings) Ltd., [1981] J.C. 23, 35
(1980) (Lord Stott). These and related issues have tended to be overcome as
problems of proof rather than of philosophy. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909) (holding that an agent's
culpable mental state can be imputed or directly attributed to the corporation and
that the prosecution must prove only that an illegal act was committed by an
employee within the scope of employment, with an intent to benefit the
corporation); New York v. Reagan, 94 N.Y.2d 804, 806 (1999) (holding that a
corporation and its president were not criminally liable for workers' deaths where
the plaintiffs could not prove that deaths were foreseeable). See generally William
S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 649 (1994)
(criticizing federal corporate liability law for being "elementary and
unsatisfactory").
There is modest support for such an approach in international law. The
1993 U.N. Security Council resolution establishing a sanctions regime against
UNITA in Angola is of interest for two reasons. First, it imposed an oil and arms
embargo against a non-state entity-the rebel group UNITA. See S.C. Res. 864,
19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993). Second, however, the Security Council
called upon states "to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the
measures imposed by this resolution and to impose appropriate penalties." Id. 21
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the greatest enthusiasm for pursuing such avenues
is exhibited by those furthest from policy influence. See Saland, supra note 72, at
199; Eser, supra note 73, at 778-79.
102. Maurice Nyberg, At Risk from Complicity with Crime: Business Law
CorporateLiability, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at 15.
103. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic
Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999) (pressing business leaders
to "give a human face to the global market").
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enforce, or measure the behavior or actions of companies."104
Instead, it relies on "public accountability, transparency and the
enlightened self-interest of companies, labour and civil society to
initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon
which the Global Compact is based."'' 5
The emergence of this and other codes of conduct that are
essentially voluntary is an acknowledgement of the inadequacy of
efforts to protect the environment, human rights, and labor standards
through
traditional
governmental
and
intergovernmental
regulation.10 6 It also reflects the preference of many governments,
particularly those in the industrialized world, for minimal regulation
generally. 07 In such an economic environment, many governments
opt for voluntary undertakings on the part of companies themselves,
sometimes supplemented through market mechanisms, over
legislation to compel companies to comply with particular standards.
The preference for voluntary standards is often justified by
government fears of being placed at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to its global competitors. 08
Such codes are essentially marketing tools, but this is neither
unusual nor dispositive of their utility.0 9 ATCA, for example, has
104. The emerging literature on "global administrative law" provides an
overview of non-traditional regulatory regimes. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman,
Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global
Administrative Law, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39 (forthcoming 2008); Benedict
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A
Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 63, 63
(2005).
105. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 75.
106. See Press Release, Secretary-General, supra note 103 (urging business
leaders to take it upon themselves to protect freedom of association, enforce child
labor laws, and practice non-discriminatory hiring and firing policies). The
Secretary-General pressed those at the World Economic Forum not to wait for
countries to implement such laws on their own. Id.
107. See Epstein, supra note 75, at 210 (granting that "law often articulates the
lowest common denominator of socially acceptable behavior").
108. See Jochnick, supra note 67, at 67-68 (warning that the promulgation of
voluntary corporate codes may legitimize existing practices).
109. One of the best known sets of standards may be those promulgated by the
International Organization for Standardization ("ISO"). The ISO 14000 family is
primarily concerned with "environmental management," covering standards
intended to minimize harmful effects on the environment caused by its activities.
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been influential despite the practical impossibility of enforcing
judgments. Among other things, ATCA lawsuits played an important
role in encouraging companies to contribute to the "voluntary" slave
labor fund in Germany. 110 Actions against Unocal for its activities in
Myanmar were also intended to put pressure on the military
government; there is some evidence that the lawsuits also influenced
U.S. policy towards that military government." In the absence of a
global enforcement regime, such tactical litigation is most effective
when combined with broader norm-generating activities. In its
application to multinational corporations, this is presently an early
state of development. A voluntarist regime may not seem to be the
most efficient means of advancing this cause, but an analogy may be
drawn with the development of international law, which is itself not
far removed from voluntarism. 1 2
An optimistic analogy might also be drawn with the emergence of
human rights in Eastern Europe. In 1975, the Conference on Security

International Organization for Standardization, ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 - In
Brief, http://www.iso.org/iso/isosCatalogue/management-standards/iso_9000_iso
_14000.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). See Jennifer Clapp, The Privatizationof
Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing World, 4
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 295, 296 (1998) (drawing attention to the criticism that

voluntary environmental standards are a "new tool of industry to 'greenwash' the
public"). For a discussion of "SA8000," developed by Social Accountability
International ("SA"), which focuses on managing ethical workplace conditions
throughout global supply chains, see Deborah Leipziger and Eileen Kaufman, SA
8000: Human Rights in the Workplace, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 197

(Rory Sullivan ed., 2003).
110. See Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601,
615 (1999) (recognizing that fear of American litigation resulted in the Germans
agreeing to pay the slave laborers); see also Roger Cohen, German Companies
Adopt Fund for Slave Laborers Under Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al
(quoting German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder as stating the main reason the Fund
was established was "to counter lawsuits, particularly class actions suits, and to
remove the basis of the campaign being led against German industry and our
country").
111. See Jim Lobe, U.S.-Burma: Sanctions Campaign Keeps Rolling, IPS-INTER
PRESS SERVICE, May 15, 1997.
112. See generally MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF THE
RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 142

(1999) (discussing that in the process of creating international law states will
engage in actions without acknowledging whether they are voluntary or in
fulfillment of legal obligations).
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and Cooperation in Europe's Final Act of the Helsinki Conference" 3
included human rights provisions that were, at the time, derided as
laughably unenforceable." 4 Despite the scom of Western
international relations scholars, dissidents were later able to co-opt
the language of such documents to call for union rights in Poland,
glasnost in Russia, and, after 1989, multi-party elections." 15 These
weak norms provided a language for the articulation of rights that
later transformed societies. It would be overly optimistic to suggest
that corporate social responsibility is laying similar foundations for
regulation of multinational corporations, but it is possible that
regimes such as the Global Compact, "enforced" through
mechanisms such as the Council on Ethics, is at least changing the
language.

III. ETHICS, COMPLICITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Though the Council on Ethics is not a court and its
recommendations do not have the force of law, it swiftly assumed a
legal character. Through careful interpretation of its mandate,
evaluation of evidence, and justification of decisions, the
recommendations resemble judgments of a rudimentary court of first
instance. They are rudimentary not because of the quality of the
reasoning but because of the limited resources available to make
independent findings of fact, and the absence of discipline imposed
by the possibility of formal appeal. The recommendations are
ultimately administrative decisions, yet the nature of the ethical
judgments being made and the dispositions of the individuals making
them has led to a kind of jurisprudence of ethics.

113. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 73 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 323 (1975), 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
114. See generally DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL
NORMs, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM, at ch. 7 (2001) (noting

the persistence of human rights abuses and the various demonstrations in response
to the repression of human rights articulated in the Helsinki Final Act).
115. See Michael ignatieff, Human Rights, Power, and the State, in MAKING
59, 62 (Simon

STATES WORK: STATE FAILURE AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE

Chesterman et al. eds., 2005) (comparing the dissident movement and Soviet Cold
War ideology, which placed emphasis on social and economic development, to
Western ideology, which focused on achieving political freedoms).
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Though the Ethical Guidelines do not mention the word, the
touchstone of this jurisprudence has been the notion of "complicity."
The term was used in the Graver Report to explain the reasons why
investment in a company may itself raise human rights concerns:
Even though the issue of complicity raises difficult questions, the
Committee considers, in principle, that owning shares or bonds in a
company that can be expected to commit grossly unethical actions may be
regarded as complicity in these actions. The reason for this is that such
investments are directly intended to achieve returns from the company,
that a permanent connection is thus established between the Petroleum
Fund and the company, and that the question
of whether or not to invest
1 16
in a company is a matter of free choice.

This and other fairly broad references to complicity were not
elaborated. By its fifth and sixth recommendations, however, the
Council on Ethics was using complicity to define the human rights
obligations relevant to its decisions. In the Recommendation on
Total, 17 quoted again in the Exclusion of Wal-Mart,'18 the idea of
complicity is introduced.' 19 Whereas complicity had previously been
understood in terms of explaining Norway's ancillary responsibility
for wrongs through investment of its resources, complicity was now
invoked to justify the reference to human rights treaties that apply in
a formal sense only to states:
Only states can violate human rights directly. Companies can, as indicated
in paragraph 4.4 [of the Ethical Guidelines], contribute to human rights
violations committed by states. The Fund may in its turn contribute to
companies' complicity through its ownership. It is such complicity in a
state's human rights violations which is to be assessed under this

provision. 120

This is, of course, partly correct but conflates the ethical and legal
conceptions of complicity: a company may indeed contribute to a
violation, but this is quite separate from the legal notion of
116. Graver Committee Report, supra note 23, § 2.2.
117. See Total S.A., supra note 60, § 1.
118. See Wal-Mart, supra note 56, § 3.3.
119. See also Weapons Systems Spider, supra note 59, at 1-2 (recognizing that
the Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 20, defines complicity to include any assistance,
encouragement, or inducement of an activity prohibited by the convention).
120. See Total S.A., supra note 60, § 3.1.
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complicity as a form of ancillary responsibility.'2 1 The reason only
states can violate human rights in the sense of rights protected by

treaty is that the parties to those treaties are states. Individuals
(arguably including juridical as well as natural persons 2 2) can violate
international criminal law, either directly or through ancillary
offences,' 23 but the insertion of complicity in these two ways-both
explaining the company's and Norway's relationship to the alleged
violation-seems confusing, unnecessary, and unhelpful.
Confusion arises from the multiple ways in which complicity is
invoked. The Council grapples with complicity as both an ethical and
a legal principle; with the complicity of a company vis-A-vis the
conduct of its employees; and with the complicity of the Fund (and
thus Norway) itself vis-A-vis the actions of the companies in which
the Fund invests.' 24 Its use derives in part from Principle Two of the
Global Compact, which provides that "businesses should make sure
they are not complicit in human rights abuses."' 25 The Global
Compact itself acknowledges the difficulty of defining complicity,
outlining three distinct meanings relevant to businesses:
Direct Complicity: Occurs when a company knowingly assists a state in
violating human rights. An example of this is in the case where a
company assists in the forced relocation of peoples in circumstances
related to business activity.

121. See generally CHRISTOPHER KUTZ,

COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A

COLLECTIVE AGE (2000) (asserting that concepts of complicity can conflict with
principles of commonsense morality and the individualistic conception of moral
agency, which holds that one is only responsible for a harm if they directly
participated in procuring such harm).
122. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
123. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and
435, 551-52 (May 15, 2003) (holding Laurent Semanza guilty of
Sentence,
complicity in genocide).
124. See, e.g., Freeport McMoRan, supra note 57, § 1.The Council, for the first
time, considered its first exclusion of a company on the basis of avoiding
complicity in "severe environmental damage." See Ethical Guidelines, supra note
35, § 4.4. The Council confusingly assumed "that the Fund, through its ownership
interests in companies, can be said to contribute to companies' complicity in
severe environmental damage." Freeport McMoRan, supra note 57, § 2.4.
125. See Ten Principles, supra note 25, at 1 (upholding, in total, ten principles
promulgated by the United Nations concerning human rights, labor, environment,
and anti-corruption standards that have obtained universal consensus).
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Beneficial Complicity: Suggests that a company benefits directly from
human rights abuses committed by someone else. For example, violations
committed by security forces, such as the suppression of a peaceful
protest against business activities or the use of repressive measures while
guarding company facilities, are often cited in this context.
Silent complicity: Describes the way human rights advocates see the
failure by a company to raise the question of systematic or continuous
human rights violations in its interactions with the appropriate authorities.
For example, inaction or acceptance by companies of systematic
discrimination in employment law against particular groups on the
grounds of ethnicity or gender could bring accusations of silent
complicity.

126

Direct and beneficial complicity are clearly intended to be covered
by the Ethical Guidelines, but the notion of "silent complicity"
would appear to go well beyond those guidelines, which requires
some form of contribution to a wrongful act. This was partly
acknowledged by the Council when it distinguished purely "passive
complicity" as it is understood in Norwegian criminal law from
situations where a defendant knows that such passivity assists the
main perpetrator's commission of the criminal act. 2 7 Again,
however, the importing of criminal law concepts to delimit ethical
responsibility blurs the nature of the inquiry and undermines
assertions by the Council that it does not need to prove the existence
of a human rights violation or other wrong to recommend exclusion

of a company.
Reference to complicity is unnecessary, in any case. As indicated
earlier, the Ethical Guidelines do not mention complicity. 28 And,
indeed, in formulating criteria for the exclusion of a company, the
Council on Ethics itself included the term only in passing:
Based on the preparatory work to the guidelines the Council accepts as a
fact that the Fund, through its ownership interests in companies, can be
said to contribute to companies' complicity in states' human rights
violations. The guidelines are principally concerned with existing and
future breaches of the ethical guidelines, although earlier breaches might

126. Id. at Principle 2.
127. See Total

S.A., supra note 60,

§ 3.2 (citing

165-67 (2003)).
128. See Ethical Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.4.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

ANTONIO CASSESE,
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give an indication of future conduct. The point is that there must exist an
unacceptable risk of breaches taking place in the future. Complicity
includes actions carried out to protect or to facilitate the company's
activities, and refers to circumstances which are under the company's
control or circumstances which the company could have been in a
position to countervail or to prevent. Based on the guidelines' preparatory
work, the Council lists the following criteria which constitute decisive
elements in an overall assessment of whether there exists an unacceptable
risk of the Fund contributing to human rights violations:
" There must exist some kind of linkage between the company's
operations and the existing breaches of the guidelines, which
must be visible to the Fund.
" The breaches must have been carried out with a view to serving
the company's interests or to facilitate conditions for the
company.
" The company must either have contributed actively to the
breaches, or had knowledge of the breaches, but without seeking
to prevent them.
" The norm breaches must either be ongoing, or there must exist
an unacceptable risk that norm breaches will occur in the future.
Earlier norm breaches might indicate future patterns of
29
conduct. 1
These four criteria make clear the pragmatic approach that is to be
adopted, focusing on the risk of contributing to a potential violation
rather than being complicit in a wrong. The distinction is comparable
to that between a risk assessment for the purpose of insurance
estimation or intelligence analysis, and evidence produced in a
criminal trial. In the first case, no formal judgment is made about the
propriety of the conduct being examined and the focus is on the
significance of that risk analysis-for present purposes, its
significance for the Fund.
Reference to complicity also appears to be unhelpful because it
imports a quasi-legal standard that, on the one hand, runs the risk of
setting too high a threshold for exclusion, or on the other hand,
implicitly asserts that a wrong has been perpetrated without the
concomitant obligation to prove that it has. This is an understandable
response to arguments in favor of holding multinationals
accountable. But the Council does not possess an adequate
alternative forum to address such legal forms of accountability. If it
129. See Total S.A., supra note 60, § 3.3 (emphasis in original).
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pursued the complicity arguments to their natural conclusion, the
Council would not merely depart from its position that the
recommendations are not judgments upon the company in question,
but would also be implying the complicity of every other investor in
that company.
The distinction between legal complicity and the "riskmanagement" approach of the Council's recommendations appears
to be the theoretical sleight of hand that made creation of the Council
possible. In contrast to the active ownership rights that are to be
exercised by Norges Bank, reflecting the teleological ethical
framework that seeks to bring about good outcomes, the Council
embodies the deontological school of ethics that seeks to do that
which is right, or to avoid doing that which is wrong. In practice,
however, deontology has imported law to justify determinations of
right and wrong, with the result that the Council has focused on the
unacceptable risk of contributing to a legal wrong. This substantially
narrows its ability to protect Norway from complicity in conduct that
is not ethical, but demonstrates the difficulty of keeping law, ethics,
and politics distinct.

IV. LAW, ETHICS, AND POLITICS
The virtue of law as a means of regulating behavior is clarity; the
virtue of politics is flexibility. The principled use of disinvestment
stems from an ethical commitment on the part of Norway to avoid
participation in a wrong, but exercise of that discretion has
demonstrated a discomfort with doing so on what might be seen as
an arbitrary basis. One mechanism through which the Council has
sought to avoid arbitrariness is through reference to "complicity." A
second manifestation of arbitrariness is less obvious and yet may be,
in the end, even desirable.
Quite apart from the uncertain use of complicity as a touchstone of
exclusion, a second set of concerns relates to the link between the
"unacceptable risk that the Fund contributes to ...violations"' 30 and
an implied need to prove actual or potential causation:

130. See Ethical Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.4.
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The acts or omissions must constitute "an unacceptable risk of (the Fund)
contributing to .. ". This means that it is not necessary to prove that such
contribution will take place-the presence of an unacceptable risk
suffices. The term unacceptable risk is not specifically defined in the
preparatory work. NOU (Norwegian Official Report) 2003: 22 states that
"Criteria should therefore be established for determining the existence of
unacceptable ethical risk. These criteria can be based on the international
instruments that also apply to the Fund's exercise of ownership interests.
Only the most serious forms of violations of these standards should
provide a basis for exclusion." In other words, the fact that a risk is
deemed unacceptable is linked to the seriousness of the act.
The term ris [sic] is associated with the degree of probability that
unethical actions will take place in the future. The NOU states that "the
objective is to decide whether the company in the future will represent an
unacceptable ethical risk for the Petroleum Fund." The wording of
paragraph 4.4 makes it clear that what is to be assessed is the likelihood
of contributing to "present and future" actions or omissions. The Council
accordingly assumes that actions or omissions that took place in the past
will not, in themselves, provide a basis for exclusion of companies under
this provision. However, earlier patterns of conduct might give some
indications as to what will happen ahead. Hence it is also relevant to
examine companies' previous
practice when future risk of complicity in
131
violations is to be assessed.

The Council thereby also avoided defining unacceptable risk, but
qualified its examination by finding that acceptability is linked to the
gravity of the harm-thus, a one percent chance of arbitrary killing
might be less acceptable than, say, a thirty percent chance of
arbitrary detention.
In addition to the components of probability and gravity, however,
there is a third implicit variable: unacceptable to whom? This is
distinct from the general question of what ethical framework is
adopted as it relates not merely to the determination of wrongs but to
the tolerance for risk. The answer would appear to be linked to
Norwegian sensibilities as well as to market constraints. To be
absolutely certain of avoiding complicity in any wrong, Norway
could disinvest from all companies. This would clearly be
unsatisfactory and would undermine key economic functions that the
131. See Total S.A., supra note 60, § 3.1 (emphasis removed) (citations
omitted).
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Fund is intended to play. 32
1 It would also be self-defeating if that line
were drawn at the other extreme of precluding investment only
where actual proof of a legal wrong could be established.
It is, nevertheless, important to draw a line somewhere and it is
possible to do so in a non-arbitrary way. As the Council
demonstrated in Freeport, certain harms can be ranked and the
unacceptable probability determined accordingly.' 33 The problem lies
in how that line is justified to the company in question, and to third
parties who may be adversely affected by the decision to disinvest. If
one abandons complicity as a tool for justifying disinvestment on the
basis that the company and all other investors must also be said to be
complicit in the wrong, how is that line to be justified?
This became a particular issue in the case of the Fund's
disinvestment from Wal-Mart.' 34 The decision drew a sharp protest
from the U.S. ambassador, Benson K. Whitney, who accused
Norway of a sloppy screening process and unfairly singling out U.S.
companies.' 35 In a speech to the Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, he outlined a more nuanced critique:
I respectfully ask the Norwegian government and people to fully
recognize the seriousness of what Norway is doing with divestment
decisions like these. Norway is not just selling stock-it is publicly
alleging profoundly bad ethical behavior by real people. These companies

132. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (observing that the goals of
the Fund are to stabilize the exchange rate and save for future generations of
Norwegians).
133. See Freeport McMoRan, supra note 57, § 2.2.
Moreover, the company's acts or omissions must constitute an unacceptable
risk of the Fund contributing to severe environmental damage (point 4.4). The
preparatory work preceding the Guidelines does not explicitly define the term
"unacceptable risk", but states that: "Criteria should be established for
determining the existence of unacceptable risk. These criteria can be based
on the international instruments that also apply to the Fund's exercise of
ownership interests. Only the most serious forms of violations of these
standards should provide a basis for exclusion. " Hence, the unacceptability
of the risk is linked to the seriousness of the act and how severe the
environmental damage is.
Id. (emphasis in original).
134. See Wal-Mart, supra note 56, § 7.
135. See Mark Landler, Norway Backs Its Ethics With Its Cash, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2007, at Cl (criticizing Norway for relying on unreliable third parties and
outdated information).
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are not lifeless corporate shells. They represent millions of hard working
employees, thousands of shareholders, managers and Directors, all now
accused by Norway of actively participating in and supporting a highly
unethical operation. The stain of an official accusation of bad ethics
harms reputations and can have serious economic implications, not just to
the company and big mutual funds, but to the pocketbooks of workers and
small investors. 136

These accusations are not without merit. Indeed, the practice of
disinvesting prior to making decisions public 37 implicitly
acknowledges the harm that disinvestment will cause. One solution
would be to avoid public justification altogether. If the purpose of the
Council is genuinely and solely to reduce the risk of Norwegian
complicity in unethical activities, it could make disinvestment
recommendations secretly, implemented with discretion by the
Norges Bank as part of the regular trading undertaken by its
investment arm. 13 There might be speculation as to why the Fund is
moving assets, but as the Fund is limited to owning at most five
percent of the voting rights in any one company 39 this is unlikely to
have major consequences. If the Council eschews disinvestment
either as a tool to change behavior'40 or as a form of punishment, 4 '
136. See Benson K. Whitney, Ambassador, Pension Fund Divestment: Meeting
Norwegian Fairness Standards?, Remarks at the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs (Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://norway.usembassy
.gov/embassy/ambassador/speeches/disinvestment.html (questioning the use of fair
procedures when the Council applies its ethical guidelines to make disinvestment
decisions, while recognizing Norway's right to adopt such guidelines to screen
their investments).
137. See Graver Committee Report, supra note 23, § 5.IA.
138. Norges Bank Investment Management ("NBIM") is responsible for
investing the Fund's international assets. See NORGEs BANK 2006 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 10, at 72.
139. See Norway Ministry of Finance, Provisions on the Management of the
Government
Pension Fund, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selectedtopics/The-Government-Pension-Fund/The-Guidelines-for-the-management-ofthe.html?id=434605 (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Provisions] (unofficial
English translation).
140. See Ethical Guidelines, supra note 35 and accompanying text (maintaining
that the ethical guidelines and unacceptable risk analysis should be used as a
means to safeguard the Fund's financial interests).
141. See Graver Committee Report, supra note 23, § 2.2.
A third ethical perspective emphasizes [sic] retribution. Evil actions should be
punished, doing good should be rewarded. In the view of the Committee,
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the need for public scrutiny of such decisions is not justified as an
element of natural justice: If a company is not being penalized or
accused directly of wrongdoing, it has no right to hear charges
against it or be given an opportunity to rebut them.
Secrecy is proposed here only hypothetically. Apart from anything
else, public scrutiny of how Norwegian public funds are invested is
appropriate, but it is intended to highlight that the Council should not
be seen as a substitute for a legal regime that is intended to change
the behavior of multinational corporations. Indeed, there is a danger
that Norway, a good global citizen, may feel that by adopting these
guidelines it is doing "its bit" to promote good corporate behavior. It
may well be doing more than most countries, but the structure of the
disinvestment regime is clearly intended to be more of a political
framework than a legal regime, and with domestic rather than
42
international consequences.
An alternative, also proposed hypothetically, would be to use this
political framework explicitly to change behavior of multinationals.
If one takes seriously the international impact of Council
recommendations, the real influence lies not in the nominal
punishment of disinvestment, but the threat of disinvestment and the
possibility of further investment. In other words, whereas the law
typically operates as a stick, Norway's oil wealth may be more
appropriately used as a carrot. At it most extreme, one could
conceive of an effort to link the Council's work with the active
ownership rights exercised by the Norges Bank: When confronted
with a company operating unethically, one way of changing its
behavior would be not to sell but to buy. 43

striving to achieve justice by using the Fund to penalise or reward is beyond
the obligations that should be imposed on the Fund. In practical terms, this
means that the Committee will not propose an approach whereby the Fund
withdraws its investment from a company that has acted unethically in
response to the unethical action. It is the opinion of the Committee that if the
Fund withdraws its investment, it must do so because withdrawal is
considered necessary to avoid complicity in unethical actions in the future.

Id.
142. See id. §§ 1, 3.1.
143. This is, of course, a highly unlikely scenario. Apart from the caps on
investment in any one company, the ability to acquire a controlling stake in a large
company would strain the resources even of a large pension fund. See Provisions,
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CONCLUSION
The appearance of regulation may, in some circumstances, be
worse than no regulation at all. The turn to ethics as a means of
improving behavior of multinational corporations offers an
opportunity but also an opportunity cost: Ethics can be a means of
generating legal norms, through changing the reference points of the
market and providing a language for the articulation of rights; yet,
they can also become a substitute for generating those norms.
The Norwegian Council on Ethics demonstrates both tendencies.
The tendency to conceive its work in quasi-legal terms, justifying
disinvestment decisions by reference to complicity in wrongs,
suggests where its work may lead, even as those terms perhaps
overstate how much has already been achieved. At the same time,
however, the artifice of a trial in which a company's conduct is
examined and judged without serious consequences may create the
illusion of accountability and thus reduce the demand for actual
change.
These tensions will, eventually, need to be resolved. How they are
resolved will depend on whether the ethical precepts on which the
Council bases its recommendations are dismissed as Scandinavian
self-righteousness, in which case their publicity and wider
significance are suspect. Alternatively, the ethical precepts embodied
in the Council's recommendations might become a precursor to a
wider adoption of normative constraints on corporate entities
operating in jurisdictions without the capacity to control their
behavior. In the latter case, the Council's work may serve as this new
regime's foundational jurisprudence.

supra note 139, § 4 (detailing the Fund's asset allocation by percentage to each
geographical region, and placing a limit on holdings).

